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ABSTRACT
EXPLORATIONS ON MONOTONICITY IN SOCIAL
CHOICE THEORY
DOG˘AN, Battal
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
September 2007
Due to Maskin (1977), Maskin-monotonicity is known to be a necessary con-
dition for Nash-implementability. Once one classifies social choice rules as
the ones which are Maskin-monotonic and those which are not, a natural
question one may ask is whether it is possible to further classify the Maskin-
monotonic social choice rules according to how strongly monotonic they are.
This study utilizes two key notions , namely self-monotonicity and center,
which enable us to compare Maskin-monotonic social choice rules among
themselves according to the strength of their monotonicities. Moreover, Nash-
implementable two-person social choice rules are now characterized via the
notion of center, in line with the conjecture that Implementation Theory can
be rewritten in terms of monotonicity.
Keywords: Social Choice, Monotonicity, Self-monotonicity, Center, Imple-
mentation.
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O¨ZET
SOSYAL SEC¸I˙M KURAMI’NDA TEKDU¨ZELI˙K
U¨ZERI˙NE BAZI I˙NCELEMELER
DOG˘AN, Battal
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Eylu¨l 2007
Maskin’den (1977) dolayı, Maskin-tekdu¨zelik Nash-uygulanabilirlik ic¸in bir
gerek kos¸ul olarak bilinmektedir. Sosyal Sec¸im Kuralları’nı Maskin-tekdu¨ze
olanlar ve olmayanlar olarak sınıflandırdıktan sonra sorulabilecek dog˘al bir
soru, Maskin-tekdu¨ze Sosyal Sec¸im Kuralları’nın tekdu¨zelik derecelerine go¨re
sınıflandırılıp sınıflandırılamayacag˘ıdır. Bu c¸alıs¸mada, O¨z-Tekdu¨zelik veMer-
kez kavramları kullanılarak Maskin-tekdu¨ze Sosyal Sec¸im Kuralları tekdu¨zelik
derecelerine go¨re kars¸ılas¸tırılmıs¸ ve yine bu kavramlar kullanılarak, Uygulama
Kuramı’nın tekdu¨zelik cinsinden yeniden yazılabileceg˘i tahminini destekler
nitelikte oldug˘unu du¨s¸u¨ndu¨g˘u¨mu¨z yeni bir Nash-uygulanabilirlik karakteri-
zasyonu sunulmus¸tur.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Sec¸im, Tekdu¨zelik, O¨z-Tekdu¨zelik, Merkez, Uygu-
lama.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Given a society where each individual is endowed with preferences over a set
of alternatives, the problem of aggregating these individual preferences into
a social preference or a social choice has been the main topic of Social Choice
Theory. Depending on what a society regards as desirable, it can decide on
a Social Choice Rule (SCR) to achieve this aim. However, in most of cases,
a central authority who is to enforce this SCR will not be able to observe
the actual preferences of the individuals. It is also well-known that trying to
elicit the true preference profile by directly asking the individuals about their
preferences is hopeless except for in some trivial situations. This situation
gives rise to Implementation Theory whose main question can be summarized
as follows: ”Is it possible to design a mechanism which, for each particular
state of the society, leads to a game whose equilibrium outcomes will coincide
with the ones prescribed by the Social Choice Rule?” Of course, the notion
of equilibrium employed is to reflect the mode of behavior of the individuals
in the society. Here we will try to shed some further light on the relationship
between Nash implementability and monotonicity by utilizing a more refined
approach to the latter.
Maskin (1977) showed that any SCR that is implementable in Nash-
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equilibrium has to be monotonic in the sense that, if some alternative is
selected by an SCR under some preference profile, it will continue to get
selected under any preference profile where every agent continues to rank al-
ternatives that were not better than the chosen alternative under the former
profile below that alternative. Maskin also introduced sufficient conditions
for Nash-implementability, leaving a full characterization as an open ques-
tion. It was Moore and Repullo (1990) who first introduced conditions which
are both necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. But their char-
acterization is based on the existence of a system of sets satisfying certain
conditions which are rather complicated to check. Danilov (1992) simplified
Moore and Repullo’s (1990) work considerably by introducing the notion of
essential monotonicity which in the presence of at least three agents turned
out to be equivalent to Nash implementability. Danilov (1990) also gave a
characterization for the two-agent case by conjoining essential monotonicity
with certain other properties.
Kaya and Koray (2000) characterize the solution concepts which only im-
plement Maskin-monotonic social choice rules. They find that it is simply
the monotonicities of a solution concept σ that get inherited by all the SCR’s
which are σ-implementable. Thus, a natural question is now whether it is pos-
sible to classify social choice rules according to the monotonicity conditions
they satisfy. The idea of Self-Monotonicity, which was introduced by Koray
(2002) departing from this question, refers to the strongest monotonicities
satisfied by a social choice rule and allows us to compare social choice rules
in accordance with how monotonic they are. Also, the notions of a critical
profile and center, which originated from a study of Koray, Adali, Erol and
Ordulu (2001), will turn out to be telling about the implementability of an
SCR.
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The thesis starts with definitions of some basic notions including Self-
Monotonicity, critical profile and center. The second chapter deals with the
problem of how social choice rules can be compared regarding the strength of
the monotonicity conditions they satisfy. The last chapter is devoted to the
main result of the thesis, namely a characterization of Nash-implementability
for the two-agent case via the notions of critical profile and center. Our char-
acterization is different from the existing characterizations in the literature,
possibly also regarding its clarity and simplicity.
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CHAPTER 2
SELF-MONOTONICITY AND NOTION OF
A CENTER
2.1 Notation and Definitions
Let N denote a finite set of participants, A denote a finite set of alternatives
and L (A)N be the set of all family of linear orders (preference profiles) on
A. A Social Choice Rule(SCR) F is a function F : L (A)N → 2A. We will
denote the set of all SCR’s as F .
For a preference profile R ∈ L (A)N , an alternative a ∈ A and some agent
i ∈ N , let Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A | aRib}. Given a ∈ A, ρ(a) will denote the
following partition of L (A)N induced by a;
ρ(a) =
{
{R′ ∈ L (A)N | ∀i ∈ N : Li(a,R′) = Li(a,R)} | R ∈ L (A)N
}
Definition. Let R,R′ ∈ L (A)N be preference profiles. We say that R′ is a
refinement of R with respect to an alternative a ∈ A if for any participant
i ∈ N , we have Li(a,R′) ⊂ Li(a,R). We say that R′ is a strict refinement of
R if for at least one agent, the inclusion is strict.
Definition. An SCR F ∈ F is Maskin-monotonic if for any R ∈ L (A)N ,
any a ∈ F (R) and for any R′ ∈ L (A)N such that R is a refinement of R′
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with respect to a, we have a ∈ F (R′). We will denote the set of all Maskin-
monotonic SCR’s as M .
Definition. Let F ∈ M . Define GrF = {(a,R) ∈ A ×L (A)N |a ∈ F (R)}.
Let h : GrF → (2A)N be a function. We say that F is h-monotonic if for any
R,R′ ∈ L (A)N and any a ∈ F (R) we have;
[∀i ∈ N : Li(a,R) ∩ hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)]⇒ a ∈ F (R′)
Definition. We say that h : GrF → (2A)N is a self-monotonicity of an SCR
F if F is h-monotonic and there is no h′ : GrF → (2A)N with h′ $ h such
that F is h′-monotonic.
Remark 1. Note that, if h is a self-monotonicity of F , then for any (a,R) ∈
Gr(F ) and any i ∈ N , we have hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R).
Definition. A profile R ∈ L (A)N is an a-critical profile for some a ∈ A
relative to an SCR F ∈ F if a ∈ F (R) and for any strict refinement R′ of
R with respect to a, we have a /∈ F (R′). We will denote the set of a-critical
profiles relative to F by Ca(F ).
Remark 2. Let a ∈ A and F ∈M . Note that Ca(F ) is empty if and only if
a /∈ F (R) for all R ∈ L (A)N . If Ca(F ) is not empty, it is a union of some
members of ρ(a), i.e.
Ca(F ) =
⋃
i∈{1,...,k}
Si for some S1, . . . , Sk ∈ ρ(a), k ∈ N.
Definition. Let F ∈M and S1, . . . , Sk be distinct members of ρ(a) such that⋃
i∈{1,...,k} Si = Ca(F ). We will refer to a set {R1, . . . Rk} such that Ri ∈ Si
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , k} as an a-center of F . Let for each a ∈ A, CEa(F ) be
an a-center of F . We will refer to a set
⋃
a∈ACEa(F ) as a center of F .
Remark 3. Center of an SCR F is not unique.
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Remark 4. A preference profile R ∈ L (A)N may belong to both an a-center
and a b-center of F where a, b ∈ A and a 6= b.
Remark 5. Two different centers of F may have different cardinalities.
Remark 6. Two different SCR’s may have the same center. As an example,
let A = {a, b, c}. Consider the SCR’s F and G where F (R) = a for any
R ∈ L (A)N and G(R) = {b} if all agents top-rank alternative b in profile R,
G(R) = ∅ otherwise. Note that, the profile R ∈ L (A)N where every agent
bottom-ranks alternative a and every agent top-ranks alternative b is a center
for both F and G.
2.2 Examples
Example 1. (Dictatoriality) Let F be a dictatorial SCR where agent i is the
dictator, i.e.
∀R ∈ L (A)N : F (R) = {a ∈ A|aRib for any b ∈ A}
Consider h : GrF → (2A)N with;
∀(a,R) ∈ GrF : hi(a,R) = A\{a} and hj(a,R) = ∅ for any j ∈ N\{i}
That is, h(a,R) = (∅, . . . , ∅, A \ {a}︸ ︷︷ ︸
agent i
, ∅, . . . , ∅). Observe that F is h-monotonic
and there is no h′ : GrF → (2A)N with h′ $ h such that F is h′-monotonic.
Thus, h is a self-monotonicity of F .
For some alternative a ∈ A, let Ra ∈ L (A)N be a profile such that
alternative a is top-ranked by agent i and bottom-ranked by every other
agent, i.e. aRai b and bR
a
ja for any b ∈ A \ {a} and j ∈ N \ {i}. Now,
CE(F ) =
⋃
a∈A{Ra} is a center of F . As an illustrative example, let N =
{1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. The following set of profiles Ra, Rb and Rc is a
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center of the dictatorial SCR F with agent 2 being the dictator.
Ra1 R
a
2 R
a
3 R
b
1 R
b
2 R
b
3 R
c
1 R
c
2 R
c
3
b a b a b a a c a
c b c c a c b a b
a c a b c b c b c
Example 2. (Constant SCR) Let F be a constant SCR, i.e. there is some
alternative a ∈ A such that for any profile R, we have F (R) = a. Observe
that, h : GrF → (2A)N with for any (a,R) ∈ Gr(F ), h(a,R) = (∅, ∅, . . . , ∅)
is a self-monotonicity of F .
Let R ∈ L (A)N be a profile such that alternative a is bottom-ranked by
all agents, i.e. bRia for any i ∈ N and b ∈ A \ {a}. Note that, we have
a ∈ F (R) and R is an a-critical profile. Now, CE(F ) = {R} is a center of F .
Example 3. (Unanimity SCR) Let F be the unanimity SCR, i.e. for any
profile R, we have a ∈ F (R) if and only if aRib for any i ∈ N and b ∈ A.
Observe that, h : GrF → (2A)N with h(a,R) = (A \ {a}, . . . , A \ {a}) for any
(a,R) ∈ Gr(F ) is a self-monotonicity of F .
For some alternative a ∈ A, let Ra ∈ L (A)N be a profile such that
alternative a is top-ranked by all agents. Now, CE(F ) =
⋃
a∈A{Ra} is a
center of F . As an illustrative example, N = {1, 2, 3} and A = {a, b, c}. The
following set of profiles Ra, Rb and Rc is a center of the Unanimity SCR F .
Ra1 R
a
2 R
a
3 R
b
1 R
b
2 R
b
3 R
c
1 R
c
2 R
c
3
a a a b b b c c c
b b b a a a a a a
c c c c c c b b b
Example 4. (Pareto Correspondence) Given some profile R, we say that an
alternative a ∈ A is Pareto dominated by some other alternative b ∈ A if for
any agent i ∈ N , we have bRia. Let F be the Pareto correspondence, i.e.
7
for any profile R, we have a ∈ F (R) if and only if there is no b ∈ A which
Pareto dominates a. Consider h : GrF → (2A)N with for any (a,R) ∈ GrF ,
h(a,R) = (L1(a,R), L2(a,R)\L1(a,R), . . . , Li(a,R)\
⋃
j<i Lj(a,R), . . .) where
Li(a,R) = Li(a,R) \ {a}. Now, we will show that h is a self-monotonicity of
F .
Take some (a,R) ∈ GrF . Take any profile R′ such that for any i ∈ N , we
have Li(a,R) ∩ hi(R, a) ⊂ Li(a,R′). Since for any i ∈ N hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R),
we have hi(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′). Now, take any b ∈ A\{a}. Since a is not Pareto
dominated, we have b ∈ Li(a,R) and also b ∈ hi(a,R) for some i ∈ N . But
then, we have b ∈ Li(a,R′), since hi(R, a) ⊂ Li(a,R′). So, a is not Pareto
dominated in profile R′, either. Thus, we have a ∈ F (R′), implying that F is
h-monotonic.
Now, consider any h′ : GrF → (2A)N with h′ $ h. Take some (a,R) ∈
GrF . Consider some profile R′ such that for any i ∈ N we have h′i = Li(a,R′).
From definition of h and from h′ $ h, there should exist some b ∈ A with
b /∈ h′i(a,R) for any i ∈ N . So, b /∈ Li(a,R′) for any i ∈ N . But then, b
Pareto dominates a, implying that a /∈ F (R′). So, F is not h′-monotonic.
Hence, h is a self-monotonicity of F .
Now, we will define a center for the Pareto correspondence. First observe
that, given some alternative a ∈ A, a profile R is an a-critical profile if and
only if
⋃
i∈N Li(a,R) = A and for any i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, we have Li(a,R)∩
Lj(a,R) = {a}. That is, for every alternative other than a, there should exist
exactly 1 agent who prefers a to that alternative. So, the problem is assigning
the alternatives in A \ {a} to agents in N . Each of these assignments will
constitute a different profile in an a-center of F . The set of all such profiles
will be an a-center of F . Note that, an a-center of F consists of |N ||A|−1
preference profiles. If we do it for all alternatives in A, we will obtain a
center of F . As an illustrative example, let N = {1, 2} and A = {a, b, c}.
The following set of profiles R1, R2 R3 and R4 is an a-center of the Pareto
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correspondence F .
R11 R
1
2 R
2
1 R
2
2 R
3
1 R
3
2 R
4
1 R
4
2
a c c a c b b c
b b b b a a a a
c a a c b c c b
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENT DEGREES OF
MONOTONICITY
3.1 Preliminaries
Definition. Let F,G ∈M . We say that F satisfies a stronger monotonicity
condition than G if GrG ⊂ GrF and there exist self-monotonicities hf , hg of
F and G, respectively, such that for any (a,R) ∈ GrG, we have hf (a,R) ⊂
hg(a,R).
Lemma 1. Let F ∈M . For any a ∈ A with a ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ L (A)N ,
there exists some R′ ∈ Ca(F ) such that R′ is a refinement of R with respect
to a.
Proof. Let a ∈ F (R) for some R ∈ L (A)N . If R is an a-critical profile
relative to F , we are done. So, suppose R is not an a-critical profile relative
to F . Then, there is some strict refinement R1 of R with respect to a such
that a ∈ F (R1). Suppose R1 is not an a-critical profile. Then, there should
exist some strict refinement R2 of R1 with respect to a such that a ∈ F (R2).
If we continue in this fashion, since we have finite number of alternatives, for
some t ∈ N we will have some Rt ∈ L (A)N so that for any strict refinement
Rk of Rt, we have a /∈ F (Rk), i.e. Rt is an a-critical profile relative to F . But
now, Rt is a refinement of R with respect to a.
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Theorem 1. Let F,G ∈ M . F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition
than G if and only if for any a ∈ A and R ∈ Ca(G), there exists some
R′ ∈ Ca(F ) such that R′ is a refinement of R with respect to a.
Proof. Suppose F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than G. Take
any a ∈ A and R ∈ Ca(G). Then, we have (a,R) ∈ GrG and (a,R) ∈ GrF ,
since GrG ⊂ GrF . Now, from Lemma 1, there exists some R′ ∈ Ca(F ) such
that R′ is a refinement of R with respect to a.
Suppose, for any a ∈ A and R ∈ Ca(G), there is some R′ ∈ Ca(F )
such that R′ is a refinement of R with respect to a. Note that, for any
(a,R) ∈ GrG, we have (a,R) ∈ GrF , implying that GrG ⊂ GrF . Now, take
some (a,R) ∈ GrG. From Lemma 1, we know that there is some R′ ∈ Ca(G)
such that R′ is a refinement of R with respect to a. Define hgi (a,R
′) =
Li(a,R
′) \ {a} for any i ∈ N . Note that, there is some R′′ ∈ Ca(F ) such
that R′′ is a refinement of R′ with respect to a. Since R′′ is also a refinement
of R with respect to a, define hfi (a,R
′′) = Li(a,R′′) \ {a} for any i ∈ N .
Note that, hf (a,R) ⊂ hg(a,R). Define hf (a,R) and hg(a,R) similarly for any
(a,R) ∈ GrG. Also define hf (a,R) for any (a,R) ∈ GrF\GrG, appropriately.
Now, note that hf and hg constitute self-monotonicities of F and G such that
for any (a,R) ∈ GrG, we have hf (a,R) ⊂ hg(a,R). Since we also have
GrG ⊂ GrF , F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than G.
3.2 An Illustrative Example
For a preference profile R ∈ L (A)N , an alternative a ∈ A and some agent
i ∈ N , let
Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A | aRib} , Ui(a,R) = {b ∈ A | bRia}
and let σ(i, k, R) denote the k’th best alternative for agent i in preference
profile R, i.e. |{a ∈ A | aRiσ(i, k, R)}| = k.
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Definition. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}. An SCR F ∈ F is called the k-plurality
SCR if, for any a ∈ A, one has a ∈ F (R) if and only if
|{i ∈ N | a ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R), R)}| ≥ |{i ∈ N | b ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R), R)}|
for any b ∈ A.
Proposition 1. Let |N | = n ≥ 3 and |A| = m ≥ 3. Let F ∈ F be the
k-plurality SCR for some k ∈ {1, . . . , |A|}. Now, F is Maskin-monotonic if
and only if k > m(n−1)
n
.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we will assume that k ≥ 2, since we know
that for k = 1, we have the well-known plurality SCR which is not Maskin-
monotonic for m ≥ 3, n ≥ 3.
Suppose k > m(n−1)
n
, i.e. m > n(m − k) since n > 0. Note that, for
any profile R ∈ L (A)N , we must have some a ∈ A with |{i ∈ N | a ∈
Ui(Rik, R)}| = n, which is the total number of participants. Thus, for any
R ∈ L (A)N and a ∈ A, one has a ∈ F (R) if and only if |{i ∈ N | a ∈
Ui(σ(i, k, R), R)}| = n. Now, take any R ∈ L (A)N , any a ∈ F (R) and
any R′ ∈ L (A)N with Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′) for all i ∈ N . We then have
|{i ∈ N | a ∈ Ui(R′ik, R′)}| = n and so a ∈ F (R′). Thus, F is Maskin-
monotonic.
Now, suppose k ≤ m(n−1)
n
, i.e. m ≤ n(m − k). Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , am}.
First, suppose that m = n(m− k). Consider the following preference profile
R ∈ L (A)N with;
σ(1, k + 1, R) = a1, σ(1, k + 2, R) = a2, . . . , σ(1,m,R) = am−k, σ(2, k +
1, R) = am−k+1, . . . , σ(n,m,R) = am and σ(1, 1, R) = am.
Note that, for all a ∈ A, we have |{i ∈ N | a ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R), R)}| =
n − 1, since m = n(m − k). Thus, we have F (R) = {a1, . . . , am}. Now,
consider the profile R′ which is obtained from profile R by only interchanging
σ(1, k, R) with σ(i, k+1, R), leaving everything else the same, i.e. σ(1, k, R) =
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σ(1, k + 1, R′) and σ(1, k + 1, R) = σ(1, k, R′). Note that σ(1, k, R) 6= am
since k ≥ 2. Now, we have |{i ∈ N | a1 ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R′), R′)}| = n while
|{i ∈ N | b ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R′), R′)}| < n for any b ∈ A \ {a1}. Note that,
Li(am, R) ⊂ Li(am, R′) for any i ∈ N and am /∈ F (R′) while am ∈ F (R).
Thus, F is not Maskin-monotonic.
Now, suppose m < n(m− k). Consider some profile R ∈ L (A)N with;
σ(1, k + 1, R) = a1, σ(1, k + 2, R) = a2, . . . , σ(1,m,R) = am−k, σ(2, k +
1, R) = am−k+1, . . .
Now, let R′ be the preference profile obtained from R by applying the
following procedure;
i. for any agent i ∈ N with am ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R), R), interchange am with
σ(i, 1, R)
ii. for any agent i ∈ N with a1 ∈ Li(σ(i, k+1, R), R), interchange a1 with
σ(i, k + 1, R)
leaving everything else the same. Note that am ∈ F (R′) and if m divides
n(m − k), we have |{i ∈ N | am ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R′), R′)}| = |{i ∈ N | a1 ∈
Ui(σ(i, k, R
′), R′)}|, if m does not divide n(m − k), we have |{i ∈ N | am ∈
Ui(σ(i, k, R
′), R′)}| = |{i ∈ N | a1 ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R′), R′)}| + 1. Now, since
m < n(m− k), there should exist two different agents i, j ∈ N with σ(i, k +
1, R′) = σ(j, k+1, R′) = a1. Consider the profile R′′ obtained from R′ by only
interchanging σ(i, k, R′) with σ(i, k+1, R′) and σ(j, k, R′) with σ(j, k+1, R′),
that is we move the alternative a1 one level up in the orderings of agents i
and j. Now we have |{i ∈ N | a1 ∈ Ui(σ(i, k, R′′), R′′)}| > |{i ∈ N | am ∈
Ui(σ(i, k, R
′′), R′′)}|. That is, am /∈ F (R′′) while Li(am, R′) ⊂ Li(am, R′′) for
any i ∈ N . Thus, F is not Maskin-monotonic.
Proposition 2. Let N denote a finite set of participants and A denote a
finite set of alternatives with |N | = n and |A| = m. Let F be the p-plurality
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SCR and G be the q-plurality SCR for some m ≥ p > q > m(n−1)
n
. Now, F
satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than G.
Proof. First note that, from Proposition 1, both p-plurality and q-plurality
SCR’s are Maskin-monotonic. Now, for any alternative a ∈ A, let R ∈
L (A)N be a profile where every agent ranks alternative a as the q’th best
alternative; i.e. ∀i ∈ N : σ(i, q, R) = a. Note that, the set of all such profiles
constitutes the set Ca(G) of all a-critical profiles of G. Now, take any profile
R ∈ Ca(G). Consider the profile R′ where every agent ranks a as the p’th
best alternative; i.e. ∀i ∈ N : σ(i, p, R′) = a and for any agent i ∈ N , we
have σ(i, t, R) = σ(i, q, R′) for any t > p. Note that, R′ is a refinement of R
with respect to a and we have a ∈ F (R′). Now, from Lemma 1, there should
exist some R′′ ∈ CEa(F ) such that R′′ is a refinement of R with respect to
a. But now, R′′ is also a refinement of R with respect to alternative a. Thus,
from Theorem 1, F satisfies a stronger monotonicity condition than G.
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CHAPTER 4
AN IMPLEMENTATION RESULT
4.1 Preliminaries
Definition. Let i ∈ N be a participant, a, b ∈ A be alternatives and F ∈ F
be an SCR. Let I(F ) denote the image of F , i.e.
I(F ) =
⋃
R∈L (A)N
F (R)
We say that b is essential for i with respect to a in some profile R ∈ L (A)N
relative to F if for any profile R′ ∈ L (A)N ;
Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(b, R′) and I(F ) ⊂ Lj(b, R′) for any j ∈ N \ {i}
imply b ∈ F (R′).
Lemma 2. Let F ∈ F be a Maskin-monotonic SCR and a ∈ A be an alter-
native. We have a ∈ I(F ) if and only if Ca(F ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Suppose Ca(F ) 6= ∅. Then, there is some R ∈ Ca(F ) and by definition
we have a ∈ F (R) implying that a ∈ I(F ).
Suppose a ∈ I(F ). Then, there is some profile R ∈ L (A)N with a ∈
F (R). But from Lemma 1, we must have some R′ ∈ CEa(F ) such that R′ is
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a refinement of R with respect to a. Thus, Ca(F ) 6= ∅.
Definition. A solution concept σ for normal form games is a function which
associates with each normal form game g = (N,A,R) a subset σ(g) of A.
A mechanism is an ordered pair G = (M,pi) where M = Πi∈NMi is a
nonempty joint strategy space and pi : M → A an outcome function.
Given some R ∈ L (A)N and some mechanism G = (M,pi), we define the
normal form game G[R] = (N,M, R˜), where for each i ∈ N and m,m′ ∈ M
we have mR˜im
′ if and only if pi(m)Ripi(m′). We say that a mechanism σ-
implements an SCR F ∈ F for some solution concept σ if for any R ∈
L (A)N , pi(σ(G[R])) coincides with F (R). F is said to be σ-implementable if
and only if there is some mechanism G = (M,pi) which σ-implements F .
4.2 Implementation Result
Theorem 2. (Characterization of Nash-implementability for the two-agent
case)
Let N = {1, 2} and F ∈ F . Then, F is Nash-implementable if and only
if F is Maskin-monotonic and for any i ∈ {1, 2} and any a ∈ A one has;
i. for any R ∈ Ca(F ) and any b ∈ Li(a,R), b is essential for i with respect
to a relative to F ;
ii. for any R ∈ Ca(F ), b ∈ A and R′ ∈ Cb(F ), there should exist some c ∈
Li(a,R) ∩ LN\{i}(b, R′) such that for any R′′ ∈ L (A)N with Li(a,R) ⊂
Li(c, R
′′) and LN\{i}(b, R′) ⊂ LN\{i}(c, R′′), we have c ∈ F (R′′).
Proof. Suppose F is Nash-implementable. We know that F ∈M and there
exists a mechanism G = (M,pi) which Nash-implements F . Take any i ∈ N
and a ∈ A. Consider any profile R ∈ Ca(F ) and any b ∈ Li(a,R). From
definition of a critical profile, we have a ∈ F (R). So, there exist m ∈M with
m ∈ σ0(G[R]) and a = pi(m) where σ0 stands for the Nash equilibrium notion.
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Then, we have pi(mi,mN\{i}) ⊂ Li(a,R) for all mi ∈Mi and pi(mi,mN\{i}) ⊂
LN\{i}(a,R) for all mN\{i} ∈ MN\{i}. Now, suppose b /∈ pi(mi,mN\{i}) for
all mi ∈ Mi. Consider the profile R ∈ L (A)N obtained from R by mov-
ing the alternative b to just above the alternative a in agent i’s ordering,
leaving everything else the same. Now, we still have m ∈ σ0(G[R]) and
pi(m) = a ∈ F (R), contradicting with R being an a-critical profile, since R is
a strict refinement of R with respect to a. Thus, there exists m′i ∈ Mi with
pi(m′i,mN\{i}) = b and pi(mi,mN\{i}) ⊂ Li(a,R) for any mi ∈ Mi. Thus, for
any profile R′ ∈ L (A)N with Li(b, R′) = Li(a,R) and LN\{i}(b, R′) = I(F ),
we have (m′i,mN\{i}) ∈ σ0(G[R′]), implying that pi(m′i,mN\{i}) = b ∈ F (R′).
Hence, b is essential for i with respect to a in profile R, which proves the
necessity of condition (i). Now, take any b ∈ A. Consider any R ∈ Ca(F )
and R′ ∈ Cb(F ). By definition of a critical profile, we have a ∈ F (R) and
b ∈ F (R′). So, there exist m,m′ ∈ M with m ∈ σ0(G[R]), a = pi(m) and
m′ ∈ σ0(G[R′]), b = pi(m′). Then, we have ∀mi ∈ Mi : pi(mi,mN\{i}) ∈
Li(a,R) and ∀mN\{i} ∈ MN\{i} : pi(m′i,mN\{i}) ∈ LN\{i}(b, R′). But then,
we have pi(m′i,mN\{i}) ∈ Li(a,R) and pi(m′i,mN\{i}) ∈ LN\{i}(a,R′). Let
pi(m′i,mN\{i}) = c. Note that c ∈ Li(a,R) ∩ LN\{i}(b, R′) and since F is
Nash-implementable, for any R′′ ∈ L (A)N with Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(c, R′′) and
LN\{i}(b, R′) ⊂ LN\{i}(c, R′′), we have c ∈ F (R′′), which proves the necessity
of condition (ii).
Suppose F is Maskin-monotonic and for any i ∈ {1, 2} and a ∈ A, con-
ditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. Now, we will define a mechanism which
will Nash-implement F . Let X and Y denote the strategy spaces of agents 1
and 2, with generic elements xi and yi, i ∈ N, respectively. Take any center
CE(F ) of F . Let for any c ∈ A, CEc(F ) be the corresponding c-center of
F . Consider the set S = {(a,R) ∈ I(F ) × CE(F ) | R ∈ CEa(F )}. Take
some (a,R) ∈ S. Let |I(F )| = I. Define pi(x1, y1) = a. Note that from
condition (i), for any i ∈ {1, 2} and for any b ∈ Li(a,R), we have b ∈ I(F ).
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So, we have |Li(a,R)| ≤ I. Now, define pi(x1, y1), . . . , pi(xI!+1, y1) such that⋃
i∈{1,...,I!+1} pi(xi, y1) = L1(a,R) and also define pi(x1, y1), . . . , pi(x1, yI+1) such
that
⋃
i∈{1,...,I+1} pi(x1, yi) = L2(a,R). Consider the box with coordinates
(x2, y2), (x2, yI+1), (xI!+1, y2), (xI!+1, yI+1). Fill in the rows of this box such
that each row corresponds to a different permutation of the members of
I(F ). Now, suppose there is some (b, R′) ∈ S with (b, R′) 6= (a,R). De-
fine pi(xI!+2, yI+2) = b and define the box with coordinates (xI!+2, yI+2),
(xI!+2, y2I+2), (x2I!+2, yI+2), (x2I!+2, y2I+2) similarly by only changing a with b
and R with R′. Now, since condition (ii) is satisfied, we know that L2(a,R)∩
L1(b, R
′) 6= ∅ and L1(a,R) ∩ L2(b, R′) 6= ∅. Fill in the box with coordi-
nates (x1, yI+2), (x1, y2I+2), (xI!+1, yI+2), (xI!+2, y2I+2) with some alternative
in L2(a,R) ∩ L1(b, R′) satisfying the prescribed property in condition (ii).
Also, fill in the box with coordinates (xI!+2, y1), (xI!+2, yI+1), (x2I!+2, y1),
(x2I!+2, yI+1) with some alternative in L1(a,R) ∩ L2(b, R′) satisfying the pre-
scribed property in condition (ii). Now, suppose there is some (c, R′′) ∈ S
with (c, R′′) 6= (b, R′) and (c, R′′) 6= (a,R). Define pi(x2I!+3, y2I+3) = c and
define the box with coordinates (x2I!+3, y2I+3), (x2I!+3, y3I+3), (x3I!+3, y2I+3),
(x3I!+3, y3I+3) similarly by only changing R
′ with R′′ and b with c. Now, since
condition (ii) is satisfied, we know that L2(a,R) ∩ L1(c, R′′) 6= ∅, L2(b, R′) ∩
L1(c, R
′′) 6= ∅, L1(a,R) ∩ L2(c, R′′) 6= ∅ and L1(a,R) ∩ L2(c, R′′) 6= ∅. Fill in
the box with coordinates (x1, y2I+3), (x1, y3I+3), (xI!+1, y2I+3), (xI!+1, y3I+3)
with some alternative in L2(a,R) ∩ L1(c, R′′), fill in the box with coordi-
nates (xI!+2, y2I+3), (xI!+2, y3I+3), (x2I!+2, y2I+3), (x2I!+2, y3I+3) with some al-
ternative in L2(b, R
′) ∩ L1(c, R′′), fill in the box with coordinates (x2I!+3, y1),
(x2I!+3, yI+1), (x3I!+3, y1), (x3I!+3, yI+1) with some alternative in L1(a,R) ∩
L2(c, R
′′) and fill in the box with coordinates (x2I!+3, yI+2), (x2I!+3, y2I+2),
(x3I!+3, yI+2), (x3I!+3, y2I+2) with some alternative in L1(b, R
′) ∩ L2(c, R′′),
all satisfying the prescribed property in condition (ii). Now, if there is
any other (d,R′′′) ∈ S, the mechanism can be extended accordingly. But,
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w.l.o.g. suppose there is no such (d,R′′′) ∈ S. We will show that F can
be Nash-implemented via mechanism G = (M,pi), where M = X × Y ,
X = {x1, . . . , x3I!+3}, Y = {y1, . . . , y3I+3}.
First, we will show that for any R ∈ L (A)N and a ∈ A, a ∈ F (R) implies
a = pi(x, y) for some (x, y) ∈ σ0(G[R]). Take some profile R ∈ L (A)N .
Suppose a ∈ F (R) for some a ∈ A. From Lemma 1, there should exist some
profile in Ca(F ) which is a refinement of R with respect to a, thus there
should also exist some R ∈ CEa(F ) such that R is a refinement of R with
respect to a. Note that (a,R) ∈ S and also note that there exists some
(x, y) ∈ M with pi(x, y) = a such that ∀x′ ∈ X : pi(x′, y) ⊂ L1(a,R) and
∀y′ ∈ Y : pi(x, y′) ⊂ L2(a,R). But since R is a refinement of R with respect
to a, we have ∀x′ ∈ X : pi(x′, y) ⊂ L1(a,R) and ∀y′ ∈ Y : pi(x, y′) ⊂ L2(a,R),
implying that (x, y) ∈ σ0(G[R]).
Now, we will show that for any R ∈ L (A)N , having some (x, y) ∈
σ0(G[R]) with pi(x, y) = a implies a ∈ F (R). Take some profile R ∈ L (A)N .
Suppose (xi, yj) ∈ σ0(G[R]) for some xi ∈ X and yj ∈ Y .
Case 1. Suppose i ∈ {1, I! + 2, 2I! + 3} and j ∈ {1, I + 2, 2I + 3}.
First suppose (i, j) ∈ {(1, 1), (I!+2, I+2), (2I!+3, 2I+3)}. W.l.o.g suppose
(i, j) = (1, 1). We have pi(x1, y1) = a, (a,R) ∈ S and from construction of
mechanism G, we know that;
L1(a,R) ⊂
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) and L2(a,R) ⊂
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(x1, yi)
Since (x1, y1) ∈ σ0(G[R]), we also have;
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) ⊂ L1(a,R) and
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(x1, yi) ⊂ L2(a,R)
Thus, we have L1(a,R) ⊂ L1(a,R) and L2(a,R) ⊂ L2(a,R), that is R is a
refinement of R with respect to a. But then, since F is Maskin-monotonic
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and a ∈ F (R), we have a ∈ F (R). So, suppose (i, j) /∈ {(1, 1), (I! + 2, I +
2), (2I!+3, 2I+3)}. W.l.o.g. suppose (i, j) = (I!+2, 1). Let pi(xI!+2, y1) = c.
From construction of mechanism G, we know that;
L1(a,R) ⊂
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) and L2(b, R
′) ⊂
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(xI!+2, yi)
Since (xI!+2, y1) ∈ σ0(G[R]), we also have;
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) ⊂ L1(c, R) and
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(xI!+2, yi) ⊂ L2(c, R)
Thus, we have L1(a,R) ⊂ L1(c, R) and L2(b, R′) ⊂ L2(c, R). But from con-
struction of mechanism G, from condition (ii) and from F being Maskin-
monotonic, we have c ∈ F (R).
Case 2. Suppose [i ∈ {1, I! + 2, 2I! + 3} and j /∈ {1, I + 2, 2I + 3}] or [i /∈
{1, I! + 2, 2I! + 3} and j ∈ {1, I + 2, 2I + 3}] .
W.l.o.g. suppose (i, j) = (2, 1). Let pi(x2, y1) = b. First note that, b ∈
L1(a,R) where R ∈ CEa(F ). So, from condition (i), b is an essential element
for agent 1 with respect to a. That is, for any profile R′ with L1(a,R) ⊂
L1(b, R
′) and I(F ) ⊂ L2(b, R′), we must have b ∈ F (R′). Now, note that
from construction of mechanism G, we have;
L1(a,R) ⊂
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) and I(F ) ⊂
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(x2, yi)
Since (x2, y1) ∈ σ0(G[R]), we also have;
⋃
xi∈X
pi(xi, y1) ⊂ L1(b, R) and
⋃
yi∈Y
pi(x2, yi) ⊂ L2(b, R)
But then, we have L1(a,R) ⊂ L1(b, R) and I(F ) ⊂ L2(b, R), implying that
b ∈ F (R).
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Case 3. Suppose i /∈ {1, I! + 2, 2I! + 3} and j /∈ {1, I + 2, 2I + 3}.
Let pi(xi, yj) = a. First note that a ∈ I(F ). Now, from Lemma 2, we know
that CEa(F ) 6= ∅. That is, there is some R ∈ CEa(F ) with a ∈ F (R).
Also note that, since condition (i) is satisfied, we have b ∈ I(F ) for any b ∈
Li(a,R), i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, we have L1(a,R) ⊂ I(F ) and L2(a,R) ⊂ I(F ).
Then, since F is Maskin-monotonic, we have a ∈ F (R′) for any R′ ∈ L (A)N
with I(F ) ⊂ L1(a,R) and I(F ) ⊂ L2(a,R). Now, note that from construction
of mechanism G, we have;
⋃
x∈X
pi(x, yj) = I(F ) and
⋃
y∈Y
pi(xi, y) = I(F )
Now, since (xi, yj) ∈ σ0(G[R]), we have;
⋃
x∈X
pi(x, yj) ⊂ L1(a,R) and
⋃
y∈Y
pi(xi, y) ⊂ L2(a,R)
Then, we have;
I(F ) ⊂ L1(a,R) and I(F ) ⊂ L2(a,R)
implying that a ∈ F (R).
Thus, G = (M,pi) Nash-implements F , completing the proof.
4.3 Examples
Example 5. (Dictatoriality) Let N = {1, 2} and F be a Dictatorial SCR where
agent 1 is the dictator. F is clearly Maskin-monotonic. Note that, I(F ) = A.
Take any a ∈ A and any i ∈ {1, 2}.
i. Take any R ∈ Ca(F ) and any b ∈ Li(a,R). Remember that, R must be
such that a is top-ranked in agent 1’s ordering and bottom-ranked in
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agent 2’s ordering. Take any profile R′ ∈ L (A)N with;
Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(b, R′) and I(F ) = A ⊂ Lj(b, R′) for any j ∈ N\{i}
Now, we must have b ∈ F (R′), implying that b is essential for i with
respect to a. So, condition (i) is satisfied.
ii. Take any R ∈ Ca(F ), b ∈ A and R′ ∈ Cb(F ). W.l.o.g. consider
L1(a,R)∩L2(b, R′). Note that, we have b ∈ L1(a,R)∩L2(b, R′) and for
any R′′ ∈ L (A)N with L1(a,R) = A ⊂ Li(b, R′′) and L2(b, R′) = {b} ⊂
L2(b, R
′′), we have b ∈ F (R′′). So, condition (ii) is also satisfied.
Hence, F is Nash-implementable.
Example 6. (Pareto Correspondence) Let N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c} and F be
the pareto correspondence. Note that F is Maskin-monotonic. Now, consider
the profiles R ∈ Ca(F ) and R′ ∈ Cb(F ) given as follows;
R1 R2 R
′
1 R
′
2
b c b c
a a a a
c b c b
We have L1(a,R) = {a, c} and L2(b, R′) = {b}, implying that L1(a,R) ∩
L2(b, R
′) = ∅. Thus, F does not satisfy condition (ii) and hence not Nash-
implementable.
Example 7. LetN = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c} and F be a SCR such that F chooses
alternative a whenever both agents rank a above c, F chooses alternative b
whenever both agents rank b above c and F chooses alternative c whenever
at least one agent top-ranks c. That is, for some profile R ∈ L (A)N ;
• a ∈ F (R) if ∀i ∈ N : aRic
• b ∈ F (R) if ∀i ∈ N : bRic
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• c ∈ F (R) if ∃i ∈ N : cRia and cRib.
F is clearly Maskin-monotonic. Now, note that the following profiles R1
and R2 are the only a-critical and b-critical profiles, respectively. Any profile
where one of the agents top-ranks c and the other agent bottom-ranks c is a
c-critical profile, including the following profile R3.
R11 R
1
2 R
2
1 R
2
2 R
3
1 R
3
2
b b a a c a
a a b b a b
c c c c b c
First, observe that for any a ∈ A, i ∈ N , R ∈ Ca(F ) and any alternative
b ∈ Li(a,R), b is essential for i with respect to alternative a. So, condition
(i) is satisfied. Also note that, for any a, b ∈ A, R ∈ Ca(F ) and R′ ∈ Cb(F ),
we have c ∈ Li(a,R) ∩ LN\{i}(b, R′). Now, consider the profiles R1 ∈ Ca(F )
and R3 ∈ Cc(F ). We have L1(a,R1) ∩ L2(c, R3) = c. Take some profile R′ ∈
L (A)N with L1(c, R′) = L1(a,R1) = {a, c} and L2(c, R′) = L2(c, R3) = c.
But now, we have c /∈ F (R′), implying that condition (ii) is not satisfied.
Thus, F is not Nash-implementable.
Example 8. Let N = {1, 2}, A = {a, b, c, d} and F be a SCR such that F
chooses alternative a whenever both agents rank a above b and c, F chooses
alternative b whenever both agents top-rank b, F chooses alternative c in
every profile and F chooses alternative d whenever both agents rank d above
c. That is, for any profile R, we have;
• a ∈ F (R) if ∀i ∈ N : aRib and aRic
• b ∈ F (R) if ∀i ∈ N : bRia for any a ∈ A
• c ∈ F (R)
• d ∈ F (R) if ∀i ∈ N : dRic
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Check that F is Maskin-monotonic. Now, any profile where both agents
top-rank b and second-rank a is an a-critical profile, any profile where both
agents top-rank b is a b-critical profile, any profile where both agents bottom-
rank c is a c-critical profile and any profile where both agents third-rank d
and bottom-rank c is a d-critical profile. Observe that the following profiles
R1 ∈ Ca(F ), R2 ∈ Cb(F ), R3 ∈ Cc(F ) and R4 ∈ Cd(F ) constitute a Center
of F .
R11 R
1
2 R
2
1 R
2
2 R
3
1 R
3
2 R
4
1 R
4
2
d d b b a a a a
a a a a d d b b
b b c c b b d d
c c d d c c c c
First note that, for any i ∈ N , a, b ∈ A, R ∈ Ca(F ) and R′ ∈ Cb(F ),
we have c ∈ Li(a,R) ∩ LN\{i}(b, R′). Also, since we have c ∈ F (R) for
any R ∈ L (A)N , the condition (ii) is clearly satisfied. Now, consider the
profile R1 ∈ Ca(F ). Consider the alternative b ∈ L1(a,R1). Let R′ be
a preference profile with L1(b, R
′) = L1(a,R1) = {a, b, c} and L2(b, R′) =
I(F ) = {a, b, c, d}. Now, we have b /∈ F (R′), implying that b is not essential
for agent 1 with respect to alternative a in profile R1. So, condition (i) is not
satisfied. Thus, F is not Nash-implementable.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The main result of the present study was a new characterization of Nash
implementability for the two-agent case. It is true that there exist several
different characterizations of the same phenomenon in the implementation
literature. The previous characterizations all originate, however, from com-
mon roots. In fact, they all start with a set of sufficient conditions which
are not necessary for Nash implementability, weaken these conditions appro-
priately so that the weakened conditions also become necessary and modify
the entire construct to make it fit the two-agent case. Thus, the mechanisms
used in this literature for Nash-implementation are similar in nature and are
referred to as Maskin-Vind mechanisms.
The fact that we start from the notions of center and critical profile un-
derlying Maskin-monotonicity gets also reflected in the mechanisms we con-
struct to achieve Nash implementation. Thus, it sheds some further light
into what the interdependence of Nash-implementability and monotonicity
is. Moreover, the characterization that we end up with seems to be clearer
and simpler. The kind of mechanisms we employ in the present work are also
promising for the many-agent case. Given the results in a companion paper
by Koray and Pasin (2005), we expect to find a family of mechanisms such
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that every Nash-implementable SCR can be implemented via a mechanism
in that family.
Given that the interplay between implementability and monotonicity is
not confined to Nash implementability only as illustrated in Kaya and Koray
(2000) and shown in Koray (2002), the approach employed in this work seems
to be extendable to the general field of implementation via an arbitrary solu-
tion concept, leading to a variety of open questions that are yet to be dealt
with.
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